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Technical and. scientific cooperation among developing 
countries is an important component of the concept 
of collective self reliance. Such cooperation would 
be a direct means of increasing communication among 
developing countries .... an effective method of 
reducing developing countries' technological dependen 
... contribute to the more efficient use of existing 
technical capacities in the developing world, promote 
the creation of indigenous technology and strengthen 
the self confidence of the developing world.
Economic Co-operation Among Developing
Countries, Report of Group of Experts
UNCTAD 1976
How exactly should we conceive of technical co­
operation ....? Is it primarily a question of c-xchang 
of experts coed fellowships, of consultants and 
experience in general? Or, is it an endeavour primari 
to pool resources to find an answer to our common 
problems and needs? ... too much preoccupation with 
this "market sharing" or exchange aspect of technical 
co-operation is likely to divert attention from the 
far more urgent and difficult task of mustering the 
political will to initiate and sustain truly co­
operative efforts to solve specific common problems 
and to build institutions to serve common needs.
- I. G. Patel, Deputy Administrator 
UNDP, 1976
Our own reality - however fine and attractive the 
reality of others may bo - can only be transformed 
by detailed ’nowlodgo of it, by our own efforts, by 
our own sacrifices ...
- Arilcar Cabral
Conferences, Fashions and Origins
Technical cooperation among developing countries
(TCDC) is now fashionable. Previously something of stepchild
in UNDP it has now become a significant focal ooint for atten- 2tion. In 1?73 will be the subject of a major United Nations 
conference - surely the hallnarh of arrival for a problem or 
concept having "arrived"! Its bibliography is perhaps not as 
impressive but at least two hundred entries could be identified.
Such a wave of interest must arouse mixed feelings 
both among those to whom TCDC is a novel idea or one without 
apparent merit and among those who have been grappling with 
its conceptual and operational nature and problematics (even 
ijf often not under the title TCDC) for many years. Is there 
really a new conceptual breakthrough? An idea whose time has 
come? An angle of attack on real problems which will be (and 
be perceived as) valid and workable by real people? Why is TCDC 
markedly different from technical assistance as previously 
perceived (or is it)? If TCDC has much to offer what has 
hampered its emergence more centrally in the past? The 
fashionability of a concept is no proof that it is not valid 
but it may serve to mystify as much as to articulate, to 
confuse as much as to diffuse, to co-opt as much as to co- 
-operate.
• Before looking at TCDC it may be useful to revert 
briefly to the origins of technical co-operation and technical 
assistance as identifying terms and organizing concepts. 
Initially they related to the post - lc4-5 reconstruction of 
Europe and were the knowledge - institutional - ideological 
counterpart or complement to capital transfers. Relatively 
rapidly, however, they came to be focused on developed- 
-developing country relations with technical assistance the 
dominant term.^
The shift in terminology paralleled a shift in 
definition and conceptualization. Technical assistance came 
to be defined in terms of inputs (eg. experts, scholarships, 
equipment) seed of costs (eg. budget allocations) not purposes 
or benefits. The concept of technical assistance was related 
to gap filling, modernization, growth, encouragement of
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mimetic periphery copying of the centre. True the centre was 
not totally homogenous - UG and Scandinavian or, much mors,
French and Soviet - technical assistance were not promoting 
the same brands of mimetic modernization and growth. However, 
the image of development as a process of the periphery catching 
up - say in 20 or 30 or 50 years - to where the centre was at
year one and doing so by importing the centre's knowledge as.
embodied in people, machines, processes, institutions transcended 
the First-Second World dichotomy.
■ Fairly evidently technical assistance - like capital 
aid - has cone under severe and rising criticism in the past 
decade, not simply for being inadequate in amount or faulty 
in detailed makeup or specification, but more basically for 
promoting the wrong type of change and the wrong definition 
of development and thereby serving as a channel for the 
intensification of dependence and the development of under­
development. Self Reliance, Basic Human Heeds, Collective 
Self Reliance, New International Economic Order are concepts 
and goals rather difficult to relate positively to the earlier 
dominant concept of technical assistance or to much (by no 
means all) of the programmes carried out in its name.
This is not to argue that TA is irreconciliable
with new concepts of and goals for development or the
international political economic order. Unless autarchy is 
established as a central goal, exchange (transfer) among 
states and among communities within the states will remain 
significant. Unless all forms of concessional transfers are 
perceived as too expensive (in terms of donor domination) to 
be acceptable or totally unnecessary because inequality has 
been uniformly reduced to acceptable levels by cthc-r moans, 
some transfers will be on concessional terms. V/liat is needed 
is neither seeing technical co-operation as inevitably 
inappropriate nor technical assistance as inevitably enslaving 
but reassessing concepts, principles, practices, programmes 
in the light of broader changes in development and world 
order thinking, goals and practic.
to begin that exercise for 
is therefore not directly concerned with north-north
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or north-south technical co-operation except as they impinge 
on south-south. This is neither to condemn the other areas as 
inappropriate per so nor to endorse their present form. '
.It will sock to outline:
a. a useable set of definitions critical to 
discussion and analysis of TCDC;
b. the obstacles to TCDC - as defined - both 
historically and in the near future;
c. possible initial elaboration of criteria for 
selecting and organizing TCDC programmes, projects and 
institutions;.
d. selected areas in which TCDC could prove
effective;
e. notes toward possible institutional arrangements
II
Development, Technical Co-operation, TCDC
TCDC is not an end in"itself nor can it be defined
without reference to TC. The fact that technical co-operation
is a means implies that any concrete discussion of its 
articulation requires an explicit definition of the ends it 
is intended to servo.
A simple answer is that TCDC is to be seen as a
means to furthering development. To be adequate that answer
must be elaborated to include a definition of development.
The definition must bo broad enough to provide scope for 
technical cooperation being feasible among states and 
institutions which do not have identical definitions or 
routes but clear and narrow enough to have- some power to 
exclude, inform, demand certain types of technical co- 
-operation. for example mimetic modernization and undifforont 
growth maximization arc increasingly seen as part of the 
problem not of the answer, and therefore as barriers to 
development; a conclusion which has clear implications for 
technical cooperation in general and strengthen the case for 
TCDC (or at least many forms of TCDC) in particular.
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Development can be defined in terms of fulfilment 
of basic human needs through self reliance and solidarity.
That definition implies a need to achieve global, national, 
subnation,al and primary (eg. village, neighbourhood, workplace) 
communities informed and characterized by distributive 
justice (of status, power, access to services, employment as 
well as of purchasing power), participation (in production, 
other activities and decision taking) and sustainability 
(neither falling below the levels of productive forces and 
their growth required to move toward more meaningful justice 
and participation nor transgressing the outer limits beyond 
which systemic resource depletion and environmental degradation 
become self cumulating and irreversible). To achieve these 
goals clearly requires both a now International Economic 
Order and now National Economic Orders and either very broad 
definitions of economic (eg. including relations of production 
as well as productive forces) or additional political and 
social order changes.^
This definition is not very precise. In the first 
place it flows from a reassessment (in action as well as 
conceptualization) of development which is very much in a 
state of flux. Second it is deliberately broad to avoid 
setting up unnecessary barriers to technical co-operation.
Third the primary focus of this paper is an exploring TCDC 
not exploring the way toward a more rigorous definition of 
Basic Human Needs, a just - participatory - sustainable 
society of NIEO. However, it is not all inclusive. Bread and 
circuses or efficient labour cost reduction typo minimum needs 
strategies, regional sub-imperialisms, growth maximization 
and predatory or inherently authoritarian definitions (and 
the technical "co-operation" appropriate to then) are excluded.
Technical co-operation relates to the acquisition, 
transfer, diffusion, adaptation and creation of knowledge.
While pure purchase and sale transactions in themselves are 
probably not usefully defined as TO, the framework of 
institution end regulations which surround them may be eg. 
the steady entrenching and broadening cf property rights 
exemplified by UNESCO'S work in the copyright area and the
aggrandisement of the old Bureau of Intellectual Property 
Rights into the World Intellectual Property Organisation 
represents raising new barriers to and limiting the scope’of 
TC (and especially TCDC).
Technical cc-cperation can most usefully be defined 
broadly as any form of co-operation other than pure resource 
transfers or common directly productive enterprises. It can 
include cc-opcration - including institutions to create 
knowledge (especially "soft" technology) for promoting, 
facilitating or servicing’such transfers and ventures.
Conceptually one could present a sequence of 
technical (knowledge) through investment to production to 
use (including trade). However, this is overly schematic in 
that while some technical aspects do come first logically 
and temporally others are integrally tied to the subsequent 
stages.
Technical co-operation is meaningful when linked to 
a substantive concern eg. finance, production, technology, 
trade, health, culture. However, the link may be indirect so 
long as it is perceived - eg. some types of educational co- 
-cporation, relatively broadly focused and exploratory 
research.^ further, the co-operation may be limited to the 
technical field with the directly operational decisions and 
their implementation almost totally national or sub-national 
eg. the World Employment Conference and much of the World 
Employment Programme.
This is o. very difficult definition of TC than the 
standard one. Per example under it OPEC is an example (a 
rather successful one) of TC (and TCDC). So are the Andean 
Pact arrangements in respect of technology transfer, foreign' 
investment and transfer pricing.
To clinical Cooperation Among Developing Countries 
clearly includes as its basic component south-south TC not 
intermediated by the north. That definition is consistent 
with selective use of individual pieces of northern knowledge 
individual northernsss, perhaps some northern finance so 
long as TCDC ventures arc South designed, oriented, controlle 
end basically south staffed and supported.
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To define in terns of south-south is not to imply
that all TCDC would bo at a Third World level. The appropriate
number of partners in any venture would depend '!'cry much on
the nature of its aims and operations. Bilateral, geographic,
regional, like minded, interest (eg. commodity producers) or
problem (og. Desort Locust control) defined, end Third World
groupings are all appropriate in some cases. Indeed attempts
to fit TCDC into a noat, hierarchical, uniformly, structured
pattern with one or moro dominating apex institutions
controlling the entire pyramid arc quite as inappropriate as
attempts to ram it into an unstructured, bilateral, market7mechanism mould.
TCDC is a moans of implementing solidenity and 
collective self-rroliancc. Therefore, moot of its concrete 
embodiments will bo categorizeablc in terms of the two main 
elements in collective self-reliance: Cooperation AgainstoPoverty end Trade Union of the Poor/ This division has at
least some operational implications. In the ease of TUP
focused activities unity is strength and unity is largely
defined in terms of the type of issue posed in the Chartercof the Economic Rights and Duties Of States;' therefore as 
broad a membership as is feasible is desirable .and quite 
substantial domestic orientation differences may not pose 
serious barriers to effective co-operation eg. OPEC. In 
respect of CAP focused co-operation it is less clear that 
economics of large membership arc uniformly significant 
(indeed diseconomies can arise) but quite clear that 
substantially similar domestic goals and orientations in the 
areas which arc- the- subject of cooperation are often critical 
og. joint industrial planning among laisscz fairo and 
socialist Third World states would be rather implausible as 
would similar cooperation among a would-be sub-imperial 
centre end its choice of extreme periphery "partners".
There is a question as to whether TCDC also includes 
south-south TC with indirect northern mediation ic. whether 
some aspects of global organization programmes (eg. UNDP, 
Commonwealth Pund for Technical Co-operation) can bo sc 
defined. Three lines of reasoning can be so defined. Throe 
lines of reasoning can be advanced fcr rejecting this brcadoni
of the definition.
The first is that of symmetry. If north-north TC is 
not a proper subject for global organisation and supervision 
(the status quo) then balance requires that South-South TC bo 
a southern not a global concern and global TC bo a third (any 
globally organized and supervised) category.
The second is that the UN system has both inherent 
and historic limitations as a major TCDC organizer or provider. 
Historically the UN system has been north dominated especially 
in finance, personnel and detailed programming. Further its 
TC has boon squarely in the north teaches south, mimetic 
modernization paradizm. These characteristics may have been 
eroded significantly but they arc by no moans eliminated.10 
Inherently the UN system's unique roles centre on global (io. 
north-south end south-north) issues and programmes not on 
north-north or south-south. In particular this imposes on 
its staff the need to be able to act as honest brokers and 
neither bo nor appear to bo automatic partisans cf ono party 
- a role which is hard to synthesize with fully committed 
struggle for collective self reliance (including TCDC).
UNCTAD's "imago” problem in respect of the integrated 
commodity programme illustrates this. UNCTAD sought to act 
as an honest broker - indeed its proposals arc, if anything, 
skewed in favour of the north‘d  - but, largely because of the 
absence of a clear initial southern position and an independent 
southern technical secretariat been mispcrccived by the 
north (and by some in the south) as the agent cf the group 
of 7?.
Third there arc clearly areas in which global body 
centred TC io simply not practicable because of basic ncrth- 
—south interest conflicts. Transfer of technology, south- 
-south ncn-intermcdiatcd financial transfers; developing 
country rvultinaticnal enterprises (the inverse of TNC's), 
commodity associations arc clear examples. In these areas 
the only TC which can be based on solidarity not co-option 
is TCDC.
To argue that global organization TC is not - or 
only peripherally or in certain fields - TCDC io not to arge 
that it is unsound or unimportant. This is not a
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field in which cithor/or choices arc likely to be appropriate.
Nor is it to argue that the shamefully inadequate representation 
of Third Uorld Knowledge and personnel in multinational (and 
for that matter bilateral) TC is anything other than a scandal 
whose actual (as opposed to verbal and token) correction is 
urgent. It is, however, to assert that TCDC must be centrally 
south-south and attempts to broaden it to include multilateral 
TC mystify end divert attention especially given the present 
magnitude of multilateral TC versus TCDC.
Ill
Obstacles To TCDC
v/hat aero the obstacles to the development of TCDC?
The past record - with spasmodic discussion over nearly two 
decades, fairly intensive canvassing for at least one, a 
large number of launchings, a few modest successes, a few 
spectacular failures (or co-options) and a large number of 
moribund bodies - warns against facile optimism. True interest 
is greater now than in any previous period but unless past 
obstacles are identified and overcome or avoided the future 
results may bo as meagre as the past.
host discussion of TCDC (or of collective solf- 
-rclionce more broadly) identifies the main obstacles as 
attitudes, absence of will and diversity. Unfortunately those 
terms are so imprecise that they can be used to explain 
anything ex pest but give few clues for selection or organization 
ox ante. In many respects OPEC's members states arc very 
diverse, in several cases notably unwilling to surrender or 
share sovereignty and not self evidently marked by uniform 
attitudes toward development cleanly differcntiating them 
from members of loss successful commodity associations.
On inspection end preliminary analysis a number of 
obstacles which are of somewhat greater precision and considerably 
mere use in framing conditions and criteria emerge:
1. Inadequacy of mass end specialized south-south 
12communication.' Both within and especially among peripheral 
economies communication is oocr and most of v/hat there is
passes through a northern internodiary filter. This, of course, 
is a TCDC area in itself .and are inore as ingly identified as 
such og. at the Colombo non-aligned Conference; >
, 2. The existing technical assistance system is 
apparently low cost (at any rate from the viewpoint of a 
recipient in any given case), relatively easy to work and 
moderately cure to produce an internationally acceptable 
"result" or a "respectable" failure. In contrast TCDC appears 
expensive, heard to organize and risky;
3. 'Trie's, UIPO and northern states at best view 
TCDC as irrelevant and - when they understand its implications 
end take it seriously - as potentially dangerous. Each of 
those groups would lose markets (bilateral TC after all 
represents experts as exports), flows of fundo (TC personnel 
no matter how unbiased will frequently tend to make proposals 
leading to trade with their countries of origin) and power 
(even if it is merely on alternative not different in kind 
from other TC or purchases of technology, TCDC introduces 
competition and strengthens the buyer's position);
4. The modernization and growth maximization paradigm 
of development stresses mimetic catching up. Therefore it is 
inherently Eurocentric and can hardly give more than very 
marginal roles to TCDC - one does net lc-orn how to bo like 
England-by securing TC from Tanzania nor how to create the 
modernity of the Piiinoland by consultation and collaboration 
with Sri Lanka;
5. As a result many periphery decision takers, 
managers and bureaucrats; do have images of themselves, other 
south states and the north which both flow from and reinforce 
the communications gap, the existing TC system and the old 
development paradigm. Doubtless there ere psychological 
factors but the reality of the anti-colonial struggle politically 
suggests these arc net adequate to explain the limited struggle 
for collective self reliance nor, given the other contributory 
factors, are thuy even generally necessary to explain it, 
important as they may be in seme cases. A part of the imago 
problem is really cautiousness eg. European engineers sure
of their abilitv to evaluate machinery in the context of
-  c. _
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their own requiremento aro more likely to buy Indian than 
Tanzanian managere only tee aware of their own limited assessment 
capacity and with more past experience with European producto 
to use as a rough guide;
6. South-south ideological divisions can be critical 
in certain forms of cooperation. They may have been critical 
in the final collapse of the East African Community if Kenya's 
strategy of either forcing SAC back to a laissez faire common 
market or forcing Tanzania out and Tanzania's of insisting on 
strengthened TCDC and operating unit cooperation in production 
(and consequentially in trade) arc talien as ideological. However 
low key this- factor is depends on the actual content cf the 
TCDC - it has not greatly hampered either the Desert Locust 
Organized; ion or OPEC;
7. Peripheral economies are very uneven in size, 
power and gains from any given TCDC project. Therefore fear 
of being dominated and/or of having a net loss not a net
gain pose real problems. The Central African Republic's withdrawal 
from the Economic and Customs Union of Central Africa turned 
on those issues and an alternative reading of the collapse of 
the EAC can bo put in similar terns.^ This typo of obstacle 
is grea.test in cases in which south-south links are dominantly 
of a market oriented and formed type eg. Indian company 
relations with firms and states in south and Southeast Asia,
Africa and the Pacific, several la.isscz faire common market 
attempts;
8. The inadequacy of the market mechanism and of 
permissive or supportive measures to allow it. to lead to 
collective self-reliance explains the paucity cf results in 
many free trade area, customs union, clearing and payments
14-arrangements and similar ventures. Market forces are unlikely 
to overcome major communication and infra-structure gaps or 
to lead to equitable (or even viable) divisions of gains 
among uncquais - especially when the only market oriented 
units with the knowledge and finance to act effectively arc 
often TNC's iilustrated_by their co-option of the Central 
American Economic Union;
9. Institutional frames for active (as opposed to
market facilitating) South-South cooperation arc inadequate.
In the first placo they aro full of gape - og. thoro is no 
serious 77 cr non-aligned secretariat, flows of data to existing 
units arp weak, channels for diffusing it arc usually even 
worse and ability to analyse critically - adapt creatively - 
diffuse selectively almost non-existant. Further they arc 
only too like the UN system agencies - slow, cumbersome, formal, 
diplomatic. This is not surprising as the UN family has 
often been a consultant on their creation or a model overtly 
copied. For at least some TCDC this is a serious mis-understanding 
of the need to suit institutions to their purposes, eg.
TCDC to collect data to limit exploitative transfer pricing 
or to create a data base to facilitate direct south-south 
financial transactions would require businesslike speed, 
contracts, critical capacity and flexibility; characteristics 
light years removed from these of eg. UND? or UNCTAD;
10. Too much attention has been given to seeking the 
true model, the one valid approach, the perfect institution 
for TCDC and for CAP/TUP more generally. That quest is 
part of the problem: relevant diversity, creative flexibility 
and custom built approaches keyed to goals not administrative 
theory cr neatness of organizational charts are required.
IV
s
Criteria for TCDC Selection, Articulation
The very range of the possible areas for TCDC 
that any group of moderately well informed decision takers, 
technocrats, managers or academicians can put forward is 
in some ways a hindcrancc. Not all can be proceeded with 
at once nor are mammoth lists of "possibles” all that helpiul 
in articulating the conditions for increasing the chances of 
success of the "probables”.
An overarching criteria for TCDC as defined here 
is that it bo relevant to development in the sense in wh.icn 
that concept is defined. Eowover, except in extreme cases -
e.g. cooperation in developing methods of infiltrating popular 
organisations and repressing struggle for chango - this
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criterion is by no noons the easy "read off" test it scons.
For example what of a joint Caribbean - Central American seed 
research development and multiplication project? The seed 
would be used in very different political economic and 
social contexts in Cuba and Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Haiti.
Its contribution to meeting basic human needs would probably 
range from highly positive to moderately negative (increased 
concentration of landholding, expulsion of sharecroppers, 
strengthening of rural elites and inequalities). But should 
this deter basic human needs oriented states from participating?
On the face of it their membership would further their 
development (as they define it) and would probably not 
contribute in any truc-causal sense to injustice elsewhere.
Several somewhat narrower and more technical criteria 
or tost questions can be devised:
1. Presence of a genuine and perceived common 
interest which can on the face of it be pursued more effectively 
with than without TCDC. The interest must be real not illusory 
but it must also be perceived to be common or action is not 
possible. Central banking is an example of an area in which
a real interest nay exist but is rarely perceived (or indeed 
perceivable). On the other hand, building up data, analysis, 
communication, personnel to facilitate direct South-South 
Central-commercial-development bank safety net, trade facilitating 
and investment credits would be an area in which a genuine 
common interest exists and is likely to be perceived;
2. Identification of appropriate TCDC partners.
There must be enough and appropriate enough cooperators to 
move toward the common goal e.g. Sri Lenka and Burma arc 
probably en inadequate base for a serious rice seed and 
cultivation improvement effort while Tanzania and Mexico arc 
probably not entirely relevant partners for a transfer pricing 
control data, collection and analysis unit. There must not be 
sc many partners that the project is unworkable either because 
the commonness of the goal is too diluted or for more mundane 
technical reasons. For example, if OFLC included all minor 
Third v/orld oil producers it would have severe problems 
because of rather divergent goal perceptions while a 140
-  13 -
member shipping corporation would either founder in a blizzard 
of joint owner negotiations or steer an unpredictable course 
under a management which had effectively neutralized owner 
control over its decisions;
5. Adequate means must be identified to further the 
common goal, for example, in the case of partial economic 
unions free trade alone does not lead to satisfactory levels 
of division of benefits. Therefore TCDC is needed to identify 
means moro closely linked to production (with trade a consequence 
and realisation not a central target and end in itself) and 
its location;
4. Priority should be given to areas in which TCDC 
is either the only option or is very markedly superior to 
others, e.g. a 77 Secretariat is needed because overall TUP 
strategy development and review and CAP coordination require 
a Third World controlled technical secretariat which cannot 
be provided by a global (N-S) body or a single Third World 
government and still less by a Northern regional body or a 
Northern state;
5. An acceptable (and so perceived) division of 
not benefits oust bo identified along with ways to achieve it 
and methods for reviewing end altering these means if the 
division becomes unsatisfactory. There is no merit in vaguely 
hoping the division will be acceptable nor in having means 
not subject to review and alteration. This criterion is 
critical for technical as well as production or trade cooperation
o.g. a number of joint educational institutions and research 
bodies have broken up- precisely because the division of
costs and benefits was perceived as unacceptable by some of 
the cooperators;
6. Consideration should be given to whether the 
main focus is one of market or exchange transactions (e.g. 
pooling and sharing data already created or to be created in 
any event by national units) or whether it is one of creating 
a new body of knowledge with - at least initially - a larger 
joint operational component (e.g. by the TCDC unit itself
or by national unit programmes specifically keyed to the
TCDC venture). In the former case there is a general presumptic.
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that coro members will cauce few problems and will raise the 
pool of knowledge to bo exchanged; in the latter the nature 
and number of members appropriate is much more likely to be 
determined by the specific content of the cooperation project 
and will*often be smaller and more narrowly geographically or-j cr
development orientation defined;
7. Similar consideration may be needed as to 
whether the proposed TCDC falls primarily into the TUP or 
CAP category. In the former case there is to a considerable 
degree, an external definition of appropriate membership (e.g. 
major Third World exporters of a commodity, the states able 
to negotiate for associate status with EEC) and a common 
interest in struggle (by negotiation, confrontation or both) 
with the North. In the CAP case much more consideration is 
likely to be required in many cases (e.g. a TCDC grouping of 
countries seeking transition to socialist and communal rural 
production structures might include Algeria, Tanzania, Angola, 
Mozambique. Whether Vietnam and Cuba or Jamaica and Sri Lanka 
would also be logical members•would require serious consideration 
as to how similar their goals, moans and contexts are). The 
assumption that geographically contiguous groups arc appropriate 
for all TCDC projects and still more its extension to argue 
that non-contiguous groupings arc never appropriate aero almost 
certainly misperceptions.
V
Areas For TCDC
No listing of individual TCDC possibilities could 
be complete. Nor is it self evidently useful to attempt a 
catalogue of rather artifactual examples. It may be more to 
the point to identify a number of probable priority categories 
for TCDC in both rho TUP and CAP eneas.
In the Trc.dc Union of the Poor field at least seven 
main areas with major TCDC potential appear to exist:
1. Integrated Commodity Programme and Food Programme 
articulation, analysis and negotiation. Neither UNCTAD, UP? 
nor IPAD can play this role especially in respect to preparation
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for and detailed analysis and advice during negotiations. This 
is a key area because the Common Fund has cene to have a 
symbolic significance as a test ease of v/hether any serious 
NIEO is to be negotiated or not; because commodities, commodity 
marketing end raw material based industrialization one critical 
to many of the 77; and because both global food programme 
delineation and control and national/intra - Third World 
food production, trade and mutual support programmes ere 
critical to strengthening the periphery position in north-south 
negotiations as well as in meeting basic human needs directly.
An articulated structure is evidently needed including commodity 
producer association (possibly including certain quasi-pcriphcry 
economies like New Zealand, Australis, Canada?), a co-ordinating 
and solidarity body for producers associations, probably 
regional as well as Third V/orld institutions (or sections in 
broader Regional and 77 secretariats?);
2. Industrial export development (to the north) 
including issues of secure access attainment (probably more 
critical than tariff preferences), market data, collection 
and analysis, marketing institution development etc. Certainly 
one or a limited number of units serving Third World GATT 
delegations would for the first tine make it feasible for 
medium and small periphery economies to participate to some 
purpose and perhaps to secure both procedural and substantive 
'changes to reduce GATT's historic role of promoting north- 
-north and hampering (at least relatively) south-north trade.
The market and institutional data and analysis areas could
be equally critical - selling FOB to foreign firms is no 
way cither to identify and enter now markets, to engage in 
sensible export production planning or to secure equitable 
prices but for some poor countries and for tho lessor products 
of all the personnel and cost requirements of a purely national 
approach are prohibitive;
3. Technology transfer - in terms of data on what 
is available whore appropriate reference criteria, (or perhaps 
formal codes) as to transfer terms, exploration of possible 
joint purchasing (or onward sadLe or sub-licensing as in the 
case of lorries from India to Malaysia, after the much earlier 
Indian acquisition of technology) means to unpackage (to keep
control and to allow fuller use of Third World prices in the 
package) is a critical area. Again it cannot really bo handled 
for the Third World by UNCTAD and UNIDO beyond the basic 
research and broad proposal identification stage. A campaign 
based on serious analysis of the proposals to refora existing 
intellectual property lav/s - presumably conducted and serviced 
primarily at 77 level - would appear to be a priority as 
would pushing ahead with preparing guidelines and supporting 
analysis for national and regional "codes'1;
4. TNC relations are less easy to categorize under 
a few heads fcr TCDC. Gone of the basic data collection can 
be done by global bodies (eg., the UN Centre and UNCTAD) but 
other parts seen to require one or more snail, flexible, 
business oriented units able to secure specific current data 
rapidly and accurately on demand. A data bank on what TNC's 
can do what and with what experiences in Third V/orld countries 
is also a TCDC field (a UN body could not be adequately 
critical in its presentations). As with technology transfer, 
business practice is a field in which systematic analysis 
leading to various criteria and guidelines suitable for 
national and regional adaptation and use could be highly 
productive;
5. Transfer pricing and import institutional structures 
are related to the TNC issue cluster but have some special 
features. Detailed analysis of existing realities is perhaps 
less critical now than creating neons to get usable reference 
price data (whether via banks, commercial information units
or Third V/orld "confirming house" type multinational enterprises) 
and to create international trade institutions less uniformly 
north dominated up to cif arrival in the LDC port or border 
post. The nature of those activities suggests small group 
TCDC units with some provision fcr exchange of data;
6. Foreign investment is an area analogous to 
technology. Data on sources, costs and conditions, .guidelines 
for national or regional codes, joint negotiations (eg. on 
debt rescheduling guidelines and access to capital markets)
are urgently needed but can hardly be expected to come primarily 
from north or UN sources nor to be practicable in personnel 
and finance terms for unilateral e.ction by mere than a handful
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of the largest of the 77;
7. Negotiations with foreign firms could have data, 
analysis and operational components. At present TNC's have a 
much bettor knowledge of the range of recent negotiation 
results than do LDC'o. Further negotiating strategies and 
tactics (and the personnel to use then) are very weak in a 
majority of peripheral economies. Finally use of specialized 
Third V/orld personnel to bolster national teams could be a 
very profitable form of technical assistance via TCDC.
Tgftdo Uni on»-of the Po-or priority potential fields 
of TCDC are not, perhaps, so easily categorized. As argued 
earlier the number of institutions needed is likely to be 
•greater and typical membership of each one smaller. Further 
the linking of TCDC and production or financial flow collective 
self reliance is likely to be much closer in a number of TUP 
cases. However, six broad clusters do .appeal* to have some 
organizing validity:
1. Creating the data base, analytical capacity, 
personnel and institutions needed to increase non-intcrncdiated 
south-south financed flows. At least three types of such 
flows arc needed: central bank joint support (analogous to 
north central bank arrangements), commercial bank co-ordination 
and co-operation to facilitate other south-south economic 
co-opcration, investment of financial surpluses. At present 
the south is a net provider of such flows to the north yet
up to #25 billion of flows arc triangular south-north-scuth.
The reasons are complex (and analysing them in detail would
be an early stop in TCDC designed to increase .flows) but
data, analysis, personnel and institutional gaps are critical
and most unlikely to be soluble by national action even by17the largest Third V/orld lenders and borrowers;
2. The technical data, analysis, orticulo.ticn and 
negotiation ba.se for identifying, creating and servicing Third 
V/orld Ilultina.tional Enterprises needs urgent improvement. MNP s 
car bo a. tool in achieving greater, better co-ordinated, lees 
costly production in peripheral economies, in facilitating and 
carrying on more intertrade among then and in building upISaltvjrna.tivos and countervailing rower to TNC s. “ However, oc
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date with raro exceptions they receive infinitely less attention 
than joint ventures with TNC's or the formal structures ofi
free trade areas;
3.' Knowledge creation (and south-south technology 
transfer) is a critical field but one in which the first need 
is probably a number of regional and sectoral surveys as to 
what knowledge exists now which could be diffused, what 
programmes exist to create more at national level and how - 
in precisely defined cases - TCDC could facilitate the 
process. For example, solar energy is a frequently canvassed 
area for a major joint effort but small scale, low cost, 
low loss food storage may be equally critical and with a 
higher short run potential;
4. Closely related to knowledge creation are training 
and consulting. (Indeed they might on occasion be handled by 
specialized research - training - consultancy multipurpose 
bodies). The former .area requires careful study as to when 
there are common interests effectively furthered by what type 
of TCDC; the latter (outside Latin America) is a relatively 
new one and suffers from the present biases (ranging from
the IBRD's Platonic Guardian complex through bilateral exports 
as experts orientations) against Third World toclinical and 
feasibility studies when northern finance is involved. 
Broadening direct south-south financial flown would, therefore, 
probably be important to rapid TCDC development in consultancy 
typo work;
5. Regional economic integration has often been 
hampered by inadequate built in 'TCDC. The old neo-classical 
customs union paradigm dies hard and has no easy replacement 
so that in negotiation, articulation, operation and revision 
substantial quantities of difficult -analysis and proposal 
formulation are needed - but frequently absent, more mundanely 
the number of trade preference and payments arrangement areas 
suggests that scree forum and secretariat for exchange cf data 
and experience rad taking initial steps toward inter-group 
collaboration (eg. selective inter-group preferences and 
cross clearing) would be timely;
6. Special problem cr project clusters (rather like
ÍÍHE's) offer both needs and opportunities for TCDC but ones 
usually very specific and issue or action oriented.- For 
example River or Lake Basin development among projects and 
Desert Locust or Quclya Bird control among problems have 
major technical as v/cll as operational requirements. In a 
majority of eases these arc not veil mot. Indeed so bad is 
the data and proposal base (and so dominated by north TC 
system personnel) that putting the blame for failures on 
lacle of political vrill may be wrong; the decision takers 
correctly perceived they really did not have adequate data 
and formulations upon which to act.
All of the examples and - to a lesser extant - 
the categories are political economic in underlying thrust. 
There care two reasons for this - the bulk of south-south 
TCDC is likely to be justified by political economic common 
aims, resource savings and capacity increases and this is 
the field in v/hich the author has some claim to expertise. 
Neither reason implies that cultural, social and political 
TCDC less directly linked to a political economic substructure 
is undesirable nor that it may not be quite important for 
some communities^ states and regions.
V
Some Institutional Notes
An opening caveat is needed which can perhaps besticbe stated in the words of the 1975 Dag Hammarskjold Report: '
The identification of appropriate issues, 
institutions and approaches can bo the 
critical factor determining success or 
failure .... There is no single appropriate 
group of countries, set of joint activities or 
pattern of institutions .... In each case 
geographic and functional coverage, structure, 
and the division among joint action seed 
coordination of national activities should bo 
negotiated with a clear relationship to 
particular objectives, interests, historical 
experience and resources.
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Flexibility not cn orderly, ordered hierarchy, 
diversity not a neat organization chart, rapid change not a 
permanent set of institutions are likely to be appropriate. 
What follows arc suggested elements not a completo list or 
pattern. ' ■
1. A Third World (77 or non-aligned) Technical 
Secretariat is urgently needed. It is particularly critical 
in respect of TUP activities at 77 level and of coordinating 
more specialized actions (eg. producers associations). In 
CAP activities it probably should - at least initially - bo 
more a ds.ta collection, proposal floating specialized unit 
promoting "brokerage house" more than actually operating a 
largo number of TCDC programmes itself. The key problem is 
to define its capacities, powers and obligations in such a 
v/ay as to reassure a large majority of the 77 that it will 
take account of the diversity of 77 views on many (especially 
many CAP) issues and not become a pro-committed spokesman for 
one point of view in serious intra-77 disagreements;
2. Parallel regional coordinating secretariats based 
on the UN Regional Commissions (albeit the presence of norther: 
members in the cases of ECLA and ASCAP creates problems) 
deserves serious study. The- idea that these should be the 
apex bodies for ^CDC is much too rigid hut that TC DC should
bo a central theme in Regional Commission activity and one 
closely related to other RC work is a sound idea;
3. Specialized coordinating bodies - og. of grain 
research institutes - arc clearly needed in come fields;
4. Secretariats v/ith specialized briefs - eg. ACP 
negotiation servicing and association assessing - to be 
carried out in large part by their own staff arc likely to 
be particularly important in fields requiring frequent 
south-north negotiation;
5. Other operating institutions og. in rescarch- 
-traiming - consultancy would need varied forms and differing 
typos of "work sharing" with national institutions. Those 
might vary from member to member eg. the UN Dakar Centre's 
formal course work has a different role for countries - eg. 
Senegal, Togo - with limited national capacity then f
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- eg. Algeria,_Tanzania - with national second degree programmes 
functioning; >
S. Where speed, accuracy and commercial data and 
advice are needed an Mt'IE form (analogous to that for production 
KlTE's) may he appropriate. For example a unit tc collect and 
analyse data to be used in regulating transfer prices should 
be more analogous tc a confirming house or purchasing agent 
than to a rcscreech institute, a negotiating secretariat or 
OECD.
Finance and personnel are often seen as major problem 
areas. This is loss than clearly valid in most cases. If the* 
common interest is perceived as critical and the institution 
as critical to meeting it unwillingness or inability to provide 
finance is not usually likely. Peripheral economy contributions 
tc UNDP and CFTC (Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation) 
are substantial and rising. For some TCDC there is no 
absolute reason not to seek limited foreign support so long 
as it does not dominate the programme. Training and health 
research arc examples. In such cases a diversity of sources
- hopefully including cone Third World countries - and 
avoiding heavy dependence on any one would appear likely to 
minimize risks, conflicts and control problems.
In respect of personnel somewhat similar considerations 
apply. If, for example, each member of the Group of 77 supplied 
one competent citizen professional a quite substantial staff 
base would exist at once. Similarly in cases cf real gaps in 
available manpower TCDC institutions can fruitfully use 
limited numbers of north personnel so long as the institutions 
retain control over their selection, work schedules and 
phasing out.
Those notes appear scrappy but net because institu­
tional machinery is seen as unimportant. Such machinery cannot 
cause anything to happen but its absence or inappropriateness 
can hamper or prevent any number of happenings. However, what 
can be said at the high level cf generalization of an overall 
survey of TCDC is limited because as I. G. PatO‘1 puts it:
When wc talk of creating things anew, of
cooperation in creating that which does
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not exist, there can be no rule about 
the horizons of such cooperation. Each 
purpose, each potential will define its 
own horizon ...
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